Question :
Figure 17-3. Katie and Taylor roommates. On a particular day, : 2091245
Figure 17-3. Katie and Taylor are roommates. On a particular day, their lawn needs to be mowed. Each person has to decide whether to take part in mowing the lawn. At the end of the day, either the lawn will be mowed (if one or both roommates take part in mowing), or it will remain unmowed (if neither roommate mows). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows:
101. Refer to Figure 17-3. The dominant strategy for Taylor is to
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a. |
mow, and the dominant strategy for Katie is to mow. |
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b. |
mow, and the dominant strategy for Katie is to refrain from mowing. |
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c. |
refrain from mowing, and the dominant strategy for Katie is to mow. |
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d. |
refrain from mowing, and there is no dominant strategy for Katie. |
102. Refer to Figure 17-3. If this game is played only once, then which of the following outcomes is the most likely one?
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a. |
Katie and Taylor both mow. |
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b. |
Katie mows and Taylor does not mow. |
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c. |
Taylor mows and Katie does not mow. |
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d. |
All of the above outcomes are equally likely. |
103. Refer to Figure 17-3. In pursuing her own self-interest, Taylor will
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a. |
refrain from mowing whether or not Katie mows. |
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b. |
mow only if Katie mows. |
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c. |
mow only if Katie refrains from mowing. |
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d. |
mow whether or not Katie mows. |
104. Refer to Figure 17-3. In pursuing her own self-interest, Katie will
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a. |
refrain from mowing whether or not Taylor mows. |
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b. |
mow only if Taylor mows. |
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c. |
mow only if Taylor refrains from mowing. |
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d. |
mow whether or not Taylor mows. |
Table 17-19. The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul).
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|
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Paul |
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|
|
|
Turn |
Drive Straight |
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John |
Turn |
(10, 10) |
(5, 20) |
|
Drive Straight |
(20, 5) |
(0, 0) |
|
105. Refer to Table 17-19. If Paul chooses Turn, what will John choose to do and what will John’s payoff equal?
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a. |
Turn, 10 |
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b. |
Drive Straight, 20 |
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c. |
Turn, 5 |
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d. |
Drive Straight, 0 |
