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Question : Question
The correct statements [mark all that : 5491

**Question**

The correct statements are [mark all that apply] To be uncertain about others players payoff functions is equivalent to saying that player i may be uncertain about the types of the other players. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is totally different from a Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games. A game, where there are one firm 1 and two types of firms 2 (strong or weak) but firm 1 knows that firm 2 is strong with probability 0.7, can be described as a game of incomplete information. The concept of best response strategy played in equilibrium by all players and no unilateral deviation are applicable for Bayesian games. Two additional concepts are added to a normal form representation in games with incomplete information: A set of pure strategies and a set of mixed strategies Players types and player s beliefs Player s pure strategies and the joint probability distributions of players over states. Nature s moves and best response strategies